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A. Introduction
Almost 4 years have passed since the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its
judgment in Pintea v. Johns.1 The National Self-Represented Litigants Project
(NSRLP) published a report in October 2018 which examined the first 18
months of caselaw following this landmark decision. The 2018 report
examined the courts’ application of Pintea, cases that distinguished Pintea,
and the limitations on the Pintea decisions.2
Since 2018, the Westlaw database shows that there have been an additional
65 cases citing Pintea. This updated report aims to clarify the limitations on
Pintea, and will also examine broad trends in how the courts have both
applied and distinguished Pintea since October 2018.
B. The application of Pintea to assist self-represented litigants
A notable trend has emerged in some cases since October 2018, where courts
have reinforced the Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) Principles endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Pintea.
In Ó Murchú v. Yukon (Government of), the defendant sought to have the selfrepresented plaintiff’s statement of claim struck on the basis of no reasonable
cause of action due to the court’s lack of jurisdiction in a matter relating to
probationary employees in a unionized workplace. 3 The plaintiff, Mr. Ó
Murchú, conceded that his pleading did not conform to the Rules of Court and
understood the issues concerning parts of his claim.4 The Court referenced the
Supreme Court’s endorsement of the Principles in Pintea, noting that “judges
should ensure that procedural and evidentiary rules are not used to unjustly
hinder the legal interests of self-represented persons,” and that “selfrepresented persons should not be denied relief on the basis of a minor or

Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23 [Pintea].
Kaila Scarrow and Julie Macfarlane, “Pintea v. Johns: 18 Months Later” (2018), online
(pdf): National Self-Represented Litigants Project
<https://representingyourselfcanada.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Pintea-ReportFINAL-1-1.pdf>.
3 Ó Murchú v. Yukon (Government of), 2020 YKSC 21 [Ó Murchú] at para 1.
4 Ibid at para 58.
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easily rectified deficiency in their case.”5 In Ó Murchú, the Court applied Pintea
and granted leave to the plaintiff so that he could amend his statement of
claim to address concerns of the defendant, ultimately promoting the
plaintiff’s access to justice.6
In Girao v. Cunningham, the appellant was an SRL who struggled to
understand the English language and relied on an interpreter. 7 The
respondent’s counsel made a complaint regarding the SRL’s irregular form of
appeal, however the Court of Appeals acknowledged the appellant’s SRL
status and struggle to understand English, and made an allowance where they
deemed that the appeal was properly brought forth to the court.8 The Court
referenced Pintea, and noted that the Principles are meant to assist the
judiciary in allowing an SRL to meaningfully present their case. 9
The Court in Girao noted that the defence advanced problematic evidentiary
positions on legally complex topics, and therefore they should have assisted
the trial judge with the legal issues embedded in their position to allow the
judge to actively assist the SRL.10 After reviewing the trial record, the court
held that the trial judge was led by the trial counsel’s arguments instead of
asking for further assistance from opposing counsel to assist in understanding
the legal complexity of the issues, and that the self-represented plaintiff was
subjected to an unfair trial.11 A new trial was subsequently ordered. 12
Another example where a court applied Pintea to assist an SRL is in Durmuller
v. Canada (Attorney General). In this case, the appellant sought to appeal an
order that confirmed a prior decision to refuse his application for a firearms
licence.13 The appellant claimed that his reference hearing was unfair, and
contended that the reference judge failed to comply with the fundamental
Ibid at para 59.
Ibid at para 60.
7 Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260 [Girao] at para 8.
8 Ibid at para 6.
9 Ibid at para 149. Also note: Kelsey Buchmayer, “The Court of Appeal Emphasizes the Vital
Role Judges and Counsel Play in Ensuring Trial Fairness toward Self-Represented Litigants”
(2020), online (pdf): CanLii Connects
https://www.canliiconnects.org/en/commentaries/70639
10 Ibid at para 154.
11 Ibid at para 156.
12 Ibid at para 177.
13 Durmuller v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 BCSC 660 at para 1.
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principles of procedural fairness. 14 The Court allowed the appellant’s appeal,
stating that the reference judge did not accord the appellant with an
opportunity to meaningfully and fully present his case. 15 Based on the
transcript of the prior hearing, the Court concluded that the reference judge
expressed his conclusions on the merits of the case very early in the hearing,
and did so in a “colourful and definitive fashion.”16
The Court in Durmuller further clarifies their decision through reference to
Pintea, emphasizing that the Principles advocate for “engaged courtroom
management” where SRLs are concerned. 17 The Court held that the reference
judge in the appellant’s case was obligated to listen to the case as framed by
the SRL and consider the case with an open mind.18
The cases above highlight how Pintea’s application can guide judges in their
active courtroom management where an SRL is involved, which ultimately
promotes access to justice and the right to a fair trial.
C. Cases that distinguished Pintea
In Toronto Community Culture Centre and Municipal Property Assessment Corp.,
Region 09, Re (TCCC), there was an issue about whether the Assessment
Review Board (Board) failed to ensure that procedural and evidentiary rules
weren’t used to unjustly hinder the legal interests of the self-represented
person (Appellant). 19 The Appellant cited Pintea in their argument that SRLs
“need to be aware of procedural options and be given information to assist
them in understanding and asserting their rights before a court.”20
The Court held that the TCCC case could be distinguished from Pintea.21 The
main reason was that the Appellant, despite admitting that they did not
understand the legal process, failed to seek procedural assistance from the
Ibid at para 3.
Ibid at para 29.
16 Ibid at para 30.
17 Ibid at para 17.
18 Ibid.
19 Toronto Community Culture Centre and Municipal Property Assessment Corp., Region 09,
Re, 2020 CarswellOnt 11808, [TCCC] at para 13.
20 Ibid at para 16.
21 Ibid.
14
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Board despite having numerous opportunities to do so. 22 With respect to this
issue, the Court held that it was inappropriate for the Appellant to wait until
the day of the hearing to request procedural assistance, and the Board did not
use procedural and evidentiary rules to unjustly hinder the legal interests of
the SRL.23
D. Further limitations on Pintea
In our 2018 report, two main limitations were identified towards the
application of Pintea at that point in time.24 These were:
i)
ii)

judicial assistance under Pintea may be “forfeit” for previous bad
behaviour, and
judicial assistance may be withheld from “sophisticated” SRLs.25

Since 2018, there have been additional cases where courts continue to
develop each of these limitations in their decisions.
In Ubah v. Canadian Natural Resources Limited, the court had imposed
sanctions on the plaintiff, who was labelled as a vexatious litigant and whose
behaviour was deemed to be “problematic.”26 The problematic behaviour was
described as filing 3 leave to file applications (none of which met the low
threshold for a possibly valid action), advancing trivial complaints, and
repeated attempts to re-open litigation that had concluded.27
The Court in Ubah cited the Pintea decision as they noted a court’s duty to
provide assistance to SRLs to facilitate their access to legal processes and
remedies.28 The plaintiff was deemed to be a “very experienced SRL” because
of his previous litigation misconduct in other courts, and was ultimately
subject to court access restrictions.29
Ibid at paras 18-19.
Ibid at para 19.
24 Supra at note 2 at para 5.
25 Ibid.
26 Ubah v. Canadian Natural Resources Limited, 2020 ABQB 554 [Ubah].
27 Ibid at para 26.
28 Ibid at para 27.
29 Ibid at para 28. Lymer (Re) 2018 ABQB 859 [Lymer] has now removed this procedure for
restricting court access for SRLs.
22
23
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In AE v. Alberta (Child Welfare), Alberta’s Queen Bench explicitly referenced
the plaintiff’s intelligence level in holding that the plaintiff did not move with
reasonable promptness to rectify defects in their application and restore their
appeal.30 The fact that the plaintiff held both a bachelor’s and a master’s
degree in engineering was used by the Court to support their statement that
the plaintiff was capable of advancing their arguments on a rule 4.33 motion,
however failed to do so with reasonable promptness. 31
In Ubah, the Court seemingly attempts to draw a correlation between the
number of times that a plaintiff has previously appeared in other courts and
their level of experience as an SRL. While it may be possible that a few SRLs
might become somewhat more familiar with legal processes if they appear in
court more frequently, it is unfair to merely assume that an SRL is well-versed
with complex court procedures because of a few prior appearances in other
courts. Similarly, referencing an SRL’s academic achievements, as done by the
Court in AE, suggests that a person’s academic skill in an area unrelated to
legal processes is somehow a factual indicator of their competency in
navigating complex legal processes. Regardless of the frequency that an SRL
appears in other courts, or of the education level of an SRL, there remains a
great possibility that an SRL will struggle in some capacity to understand
complex court procedures and legal processes.
Further to the extension of these court-developed limitations referenced in
the 2018 report, we have now identified two additional avenues of judicial
reasoning that suggest further limitations on the application of Pintea.
i)

The CJC Principles in Pintea do not confer a special status on
SRLs

A recurring notion expressed by some courts citing Pintea since 2018 is that
the CJC Principles (Principles) recognized by the Supreme Court in Pintea do
not confer a special status to SRLs.
In Lymer (Re), the court turned their attention to the plaintiff’s status as an
SRL, citing the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the Principles in Pintea.32
AE v. Alberta (Child Welfare) 2019 ABQB 401 [AE] at para 30.
Ibid.
32 Lymer at para 117.
30
31
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While the Court acknowledged the special needs that SRLs have when they
appear in court, the Court went on to state that these principles of fairness
cannot be used as a “sword” by SRLs.33 This commentary was made by the
Court in response to the plaintiff’s action of placing blame for deficiencies in
his pleadings on others. 34 The Alberta Court of Appeals proceeded to reverse
the decision in Lymer (Re), stating that an SRL is not “vexatious” if they are
merely confused about the procedures surrounding their case, or passionate
about the merit of their cause.35 While Lymer focuses on striking down the
procedure formerly adopted in Alberta imposing court restriction orders,
rather than the application of Pintea, it makes some clarifications around what
behaviour can be considered “vexatious” that are useful for future
applications of Pintea. The Court also notes, however, that being an SRL does
not excuse abuse of court procedures.36
In C.A.T. v. S.T.B., the Court further expanded on the notion that the Principles
do not confer a special status on SRLs.37 The Court referenced the fact that the
Principles were adopted with the intent of promoting equal access to justice in
Canada, aiming to “provide practical guidance to judges and others to ensure
fairness to self-represented litigants.”38 However, the Court also stressed that
fairness is a “two-way street.”39 An SRL is expected to take reasonable
measures to familiarize themselves with the legal procedures relevant to their
case, and to respect court processes. The Court in C.A.T. concluded that a judge
has no obligation to assist an SRL who makes no reasonable effort to prepare
for their case, who does not respect court processes, or who is abusive. 40
Although Pintea established that judges have a duty to follow the Principles to
assist an SRL in receiving a fair opportunity to present their case, neither the
Principles nor the Supreme Court’s decision in Pintea suggests that SRLs are
exempt from trying their best to adhere to court procedures (the “two-way
street”).

Ibid.
Ibid at para 114.
35 Jonsson v. Lymer 2020 ABCA 167 [Lymer appeal] at paras 8, 14.
36 Ibid at para 15.
37 C.A.T. v. S.T.B. 2020 BCSC 593 [C.A.T.].
38 Ibid at para 41.
39 Ibid at para 48.
40 Ibid.
33
34
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ii)

There is no duty on opposing counsel to assist SRLs

Another line of judicial reasoning that has surfaced in a few cases that cite
Pintea is that there is no duty on opposing counsel to assist SRLs.
In Gadsby v. British Columbia (Attorney General), the plaintiff relied on the
Principles in Pintea to submit that the opposing counsel owed her a duty of
care to ensure that she had a fair hearing.41 The Court in Gadsby accepted
opposing counsel’s argument that Pintea does not create a duty on lawyers
with respect to how they interact with SRLs on the opposing party. 42 This
reasoning provides clarification that other legal actors in the courtroom,
including opposing counsel, do not hold the same duty that court
administrators or judges have to assist SRLs.43
Similarly in Girao v. Cunningham, discussed above, while the Court applied the
Pintea principles, it also recognized that these did not extend to a duty on
opposing counsel. 44 Instead the Court said that the duty of opposing counsel is
limited to the relevant professional regulation, here sections 7.2-7.9 in the
Law Society of Ontario’s Rules of Professional Conduct.45
E. “Striking the Balance”—a two-way street
The Supreme Court in Pintea explicitly endorsed the Principles that were
established by the Canadian Judicial Council with respect to SRLs. Since then,
cases involving SRLs have referenced Pintea and the concept of “striking a
balance” between the duty of an SRL to meaningfully prepare their argument,
and a judge’s duty to assist an SRL.
In Grover v. CUPE Local 211 (Saanich) and another, the Court acknowledged
the duty of the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal to ensure that SRLs
are provided with fair access to justice and equal treatment, as per the
Principles.46 In this case, however, the plaintiff displayed behaviour on various
occasions that pointed towards a lack of preparedness. Some examples of this
Gadsby v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 2019 BCSC 1596 [Gadsby] at para 87.
Ibid at para 88.
43 Cite CJC Principles, principle 4
44 Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260 at para 152 [Girao].
45 Ibid at para 152.
46 Grover v. CUPE Local 211 (Saanich) and another 2020 BCHRT 205 [Grover] at para 49.
41
42
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included missing five out of six filing deadlines, failure to respond to requests
for providing further documentation, and failing to procure necessary
information despite being granted multiple extensions of time.47 The Court
concluded that the Tribunal was not obligated to assist an SRL who made no
reasonable effort to prepare their own case.48
Similar sentiments were conveyed by the Court in C.A.T. v. S.T.B,49 discussed
above. A fair process, the Court said, is a “two-way street” because there are
limits to the extent that a judge or administrator can assist an SRL. 50 Similarly
to Grover, the Court in C.A.T. stated that judges do not have an obligation to
assist an SRL who makes no reasonable effort to prepare their case, or to
assist in situations where an SRL was disrespectful or abusive. 51 Furthermore,
an SRL is expected to familiarize themself with relevant procedures and
practices as they apply to their case.52
F. Conclusions
Since the release of our last report in October 2018,53 there have been some
important developments in the application of the Pintea doctrine. Courts have
applied Pintea to actively assist SRLs in certain cases, and have generally
acknowledged the role of the Principles in guiding judges and court
administrators to assist SRLs to the extent that it affords them a fair trial.
However, the most notable developments are the two additional courtdeveloped limitations on Pintea, namely that there is no duty on opposing
counsel to assist SRLs, and that the Principles do not confer a special status on
SRLs.
These additional court-developed limitations appear to fall in the same vein as
the prior two limitations relating to withholding judicial assistance for SRLs
who appear to be “experienced” or “well-educated.”54 References have been
Ibid at paras 50-52.
Ibid at para 68.
49 C.A.T. v. S.T.B. 2020 BCSC 593 [C.A.T.].
50 Ibid at para 48.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Supra at note 2.
54 Ibid at pages 5-8.
47
48
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made by some courts to the notion that SRLs may use Pintea as a sword,
rather than a shield, to advance their case.55 Such statements may reflect
subjective perceptions of an SRL’s “best efforts,” and may undermine the true
utility of Pintea as an endorsement of the use of the Principles to guide judges
in their assistance to SRLs to ensure fair trials.
The direction and tone of this case law raises some concerns. One is that the
use of the expression “special status” evokes the idea that SRLs (like “special
interest groups”) are trying to get an unfair advantage by exploiting their
position. Similar language is common in political debates over the extension of
“levelling treatment” to marginalized groups.
Second, the case law is developing a highly subjective standard for evaluating
an SRL’s “best effort.” The court process is complex, and SRLs face many
difficulties in navigating the process. While it is important for judges to
continue to assist SRLs to the greatest extent possible, it is equally important
to underscore the importance of SRLs taking reasonable steps to ensure that
they are familiar with the relevant procedures, rules, and practices with
respect to their case. This “reasonable” expectation should not simply be an
extension or reflection of a judge’s personal feelings about managing SRLs in
their court.
Finally, it is noticeable how much of the jurisprudence restricting or limiting
the application of Pintea continues to come from Alberta. A regional difference
this marked is a matter of some concern.
Furthermore, inconsistencies in this standard may emerge where an SRL is
perceived to be experienced or well-educated by the court.56 This
presumptive line of reasoning may endanger the principles of fairness and
justice where SRLs are concerned, and courts should exercise caution to avoid
employing a subjective standard that undermines access to justice for SRLs.
Our concern moving forward is over how this “reasonable” expectation can be
measured so that it is consistent, and not subjective.
In light of adjustments to court procedures due to COVID-19 restrictions, SRLs
now face even more (frequently changing) procedural rules to follow in
55
56

Supra at note 24. (Lymer (Re) 2018 ABQB 859 at para 117.)
Biley v. Sherwood Ford Sales Limited 2019 ABQB 95 at para 108.
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bringing their cases forward. As acknowledged by the Supreme Court’s
endorsement of the Principles in Pintea, it is imperative for judges and court
administrators to assist SRLs in accordance with the Principles to ensure that
the interests of fairness and equal access to justice are upheld.
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